Perception of Space by Multiple Intrinsic Frames of Reference by Sun, Yanlong & Wang, Hongbin
Perception of Space by Multiple Intrinsic Frames of
Reference
Yanlong Sun*, Hongbin Wang
School of Health Information Sciences, University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, Houston, Texas, United States of America
Abstract
It has been documented that when memorizing a physical space, the person’s mental representation of that space is biased
with distortion and segmentation. Two experiments reported here suggest that distortion and segmentation arise due to a
hierarchical organization of the spatial representation. The spatial relations associated with salient landmarks are more
strongly encoded and easier to recall than those associated with non-salient landmarks. In the presence of multiple salient
landmarks, multiple intrinsic frames of reference are formed and spatial relations are anchored to each individual frame of
reference. Multiple such representations may co-exist and interactively determine a person’s spatial performance.
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Introduction
While it is generally accepted that any physical space has to be
somehow digested and encoded in a psychological space in order
to be cognitively useful, a large body of evidence has convincingly
shown that a psychological space is not an exact copy of the
corresponding physical space. On one hand, a physical space can
be defined as perfectly three-dimensional, absolute, unified,
continuous, and Euclidean. On the other hand, it is well
documented that the psychological space is often segmented,
relative, partial, distorted, and non-Euclidean [1–5].
The discrepancies between the physical space and the
psychological space manifest themselves in the judgment of
geographical information such as locations and bearings [2,6–
13]. Stevens and Coupe [12] first proposed that the representa-
tions of spatial relations are hierarchically organized. Hirtle and
Jonides [6] suggested that people misjudge geographical locations
with the biases or distortions appearing to be based on subjective
spatial categories. When asked to point out landmarks in a map,
participants in Hirtle and Jonides’ experiments overestimated
distances for between-cluster pairs and underestimated them for
within-cluster pairs, suggesting that they formed subjective spatial
categories even without seeing well-defined boundaries in the
space. The category adjustment model [14–15] suggests that
people represent spatial locations at more than one level of spatial
resolution. Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Duncan [14] showed
participants a circle with a dot in it then asked the participants
to reproduce the dot position based on memory. They found that
the reproduced positions systematically deviated from their
original positions. Specifically, if the circle was divided into
horizontal-vertical and radial slices, the reproduced dots were
often displaced toward the center of the slices in which they fall.
This result suggests that a psychological space might be
hierarchically represented and there is a central tendency at each
hierarchical level (e.g., the slice) which all other spatial information
is anchored upon. When memories at the finer level are inexact,
categorical information is more heavily weighted and biases can
arise.
The hierarchical organization of psychological space is also
documented in other tasks of geographical judgment [for a review,
see 10]. The view of perceptual heuristics [11,13] posits that the
biases or distortions occur due to heuristics derived from principles
of perceptual organization. For example, people tend to misjudge
South America to be far more west than it actually is because they
‘‘align’’ North America and South America into a simple unit
along a longitudinal axis. In contrast, the view of categorical
organization [7–9] proposes that people’s subjective representation
of geographic locations is principally categorical rather than due to
perceptual (or figurative) processing. For example, people tend to
group North America into four regions (Canada, the northern
U.S., the southern U.S., and Mexico). Their estimates showed
definite jumps when region boundaries were crossed with little
differentiation for estimates within regions. Using hypothetical
maps, the experiments by Newcombe and Chiang [10] showed
that the learning of geographical information may be more based
on perceptual heuristics than on categorical organization.
However, they also suggest that it is possible that both perceptual
heuristics and categorical organization play roles in learning
graphical locations depending on the context in which information
is learned. In lack of specific knowledge of categories gained from
personal experiences such as from film, TV show and actual travel,
geographic representations may be based more on the use of
perceptual heuristics than on categorical organization.
In the present study we examined the hierarchical organization
of psychological space by people’s usage of multiple intrinsic
frames of reference. The concept of frame of reference has played
an essential role in investigating the psychological representation
of physical space and it has been well accepted that different
frames of references are utilized in spatial representation, such as
egocentric, intrinsic and allocentric systems [16–26]. Different
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 May 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 5 | e10442from the egocentric system (self-centered) or the allocentric system
(referenced to an absolute frame), the intrinsic reference system
anchors on the particular objects in the environment. This feature
makes the intrinsic reference system particularly relevant in the
task of memorizing geographic information from maps (real or
hypothetical) and the spatial relations in a layout of objects. More
recently, the importance of spatial representations in intrinsic
reference systems has gained attention in human spatial behavior
[22,27–29]. For instance, Mou and his colleagues demonstrated
that inter-object spatial relations were specified with respect to an
intrinsic reference direction in the scene. H. Wang et al. [29] show
that the updating of spatial relations in intrinsic reference system is
affected by the salience level of the object that provides the anchor
to the reference system. In the present study, we hypothesize that
in memorizing the spatial relations, multiple distinctive intrinsic
frames of reference are established based on multiple salient
landmarks. Then, the psychological representation of the physical
space is distorted and segmented hierarchically due to the co-
existence and the interaction between individual reference
systems.
Our hypotheses are derived from an integrated theory of human
spatial representations called FORMS, ‘‘Frame of Reference
based Maps of Salience’’ [29–32]. Specifically, if we present to
subjects an environment (such as a hypothetical map), in which
some objects are made salient, either through top-down influences
(e.g., emphasizing their importance by instructions) or bottom-up
distinction (e.g., perceptually standing out from other objects), and
ask subjects to remember the layout of the environment, then we
would expect the encoding of the environment would be anchored
around these salient objects. That is, multiple intrinsic frames of
reference can be formed in which the origin and axes of the
reference systems are anchored on the salient objects. Within
individual reference systems, distortions from the physical space
arise since the relative locations of these objects are not treated
equally in the psychological space. For example, objects that are
directly paired with the origin or the axes of the reference system
are more strongly associated with each other. Furthermore,
segmentation would occur across different reference systems. An
object pair belonging to the same reference system would be more
strongly associated with each other than an object pair that comes
from different reference systems.
Different from previous studies that used accuracy as criterion
of biases (such as judgment of distance and bearings), we used
reaction times in recalling relative locations as a measure of the
distortion and segmentation in the psychological representations of
the physical space. Specifically, the experiments used strictly
controlled object arrays to examine the roles of salient landmarks
and figurative configurations of the physical map (such as the
center point). As a result of the formation of distinctive intrinsic
reference systems, if we measure the time it takes to retrieve the
spatial relations from memory the reaction times should show a
symmetrical pattern surrounding the anchoring object (hence
referred to as ‘‘landmark’’). In other words, reaction time is not
always proportional to the corresponding physical distance.
Rather, it is determined by the ‘‘psychological distance’’ defined
within individual reference systems. The retrieval of the spatial
relation between object pairs that directly involve the landmarks or
belong to the same reference system would be faster than those




Experiment 1 measured the reaction time pattern in a simple
object layout and the salience effect of the anchoring object
(landmark) in the intrinsic frame of reference (Figure 1).
Among the 28 total possible object pairs in each array, we
classified them into 7 groups based on two variables (see Table 1).
One was whether the pair involved the landmark, which could be
a landmark-object relation (e.g., the chicken and the blue
landmark in Figure 1) or a landmark-linked relation (e.g., the
chicken and the guitar in Figure 1). The other one was the
distance, which could be 1, 1.414, 2, and 2.818 (arbitrary unit, 1
unit is defined as the shortest distance between two adjacent
objects).
Figure 1. The object layout in Experiment 1. The cross in the middle of the object array in the salient condition was made perceptually
distinctive with blue coloring while all other objects were in black-and-white.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010442.g001
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standard deviation of 4.65%. The subjects’ reaction time as a
function of the salience condition and group number is shown in
Figure 2. The overall statistical analyses showed that both the
salience effect (mean difference =143.84 ms, F(1, 19) =16.03,
p,.01, estimated effect size =.458) and the object grouping effect
(F(6, 114) =20.36, p,.01, estimated effect size =.517) were
significant, as well as their interaction (F (6, 114) =4.72, p,.01).
Since our main interest was to examine the role of landmarks
rather than the distance, we focus on the comparisons of two pairs
of groups with comparable distances. Figure 3A shows the
comparison between groups 1 and 2, and Figure 3B shows the
comparison between groups 3 and 4. Two major observations can
be made from Figures 3A and 3B. First, reflected in reaction times,
distortions in the psychological space occurred before introducing
the salient landmark. This effect is more apparent in Figure 3B.
Comparing groups 3 and 4 on the non-salient condition only,
whereas the distance between the object pairs was the same, RT
was significantly faster in group 3 in which the object pair
contained the central object (mean difference =528.8 ms, t(19) =
5.78, p,.001). Second, introducing a salient landmark not only
significantly reduced the overall reaction time but also amplified
the distortion. This effect can be observed in Figure 2, which
shows the significant main effect of salience and the significant
interaction between the salience effect and the group effect. It
indicates that the introduction of a salient landmark has
significantly changed the psychological representation of the
physical map.
Further analyses including all groups showed that only the
groups 1, 3, 5, and 6 showed significant salience effect (group 3 has
the smallest mean difference of 202.5 ms with a standard error of
54.72) and that the groups 2, 4, and 7 did not. This was what we
predicted given that those pairs in those significant groups all
involved the landmark, indicating that the spatial representations
were organized around the salient landmarks in a hierarchical
fashion. This result was especially interesting given that we did not
Table 1. The classification of object pairs in Experiment 1.
Group # of pairs (28 total) Landmark-linked Landmark-object Distance Example
1 4 no yes 1 landmark-carrot
2 8 no no 1 chicken-carrot
3 4 no yes 1.414 landmark-chicken
4 4 no no 1.414 crocodile-carrot
5 2 yes no 2 carrot-hand
6 4 no no 2 chicken-anchor
7 2 yes no 2.818 chicken-guitar
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010442.t001
Figure 2. Reaction time in Experiment 1 based on salience and group variables. The error bars are standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010442.g002
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in the encoding and subjects were free to choose their own
encoding strategy, an indication that in our experiment,
hierarchical organization is induced by perceptual properties.
Together, Experiment 1 clearly showed a distortion pattern in
which the associations involving the center object were stronger
than other associations, as if the psychological space had been
‘‘compressed’’ towards the central. Such distortion became
significantly greater when the saliency level of the central object
was increased.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 extended Experiment 1 in a more complex
environment for two purposes. First, besides the distortions in the
psychological space within a single frame of reference, we also
hypothesize that distortions will be segmented and arise across
multiple frames of reference. Thus, it remains to be tested whether
multiple frames of reference will be constructed given multiple
salient landmarks and how distortions would occur correspond-
ingly. Second, the salient landmark was positioned at the center of
the object array in Experiment 1 and it showed that the central
location alone without a salient landmark can distort the reaction
time pattern. We need to compare the relative roles of the salient
landmarks and the natural figurative configuration of the physical
map during the construction of the frames of reference.
Among eleven subjects the average accuracy was 96.8% with a
standard deviation of 2.44%. Since the size of the object array has
almost been doubled, the possible combinations of object pairs in
Experiment 2 were much more complicated than in Experiment 1.
To simplify, we focused on 4 groups of object pairs with the same
between-pair distances. Figure 4 shows these focus groups. Group
1 (double lines) represents objects paired with both of two salient
landmarks. Group 2 (solid lines) represents objects paired with
only one of the salient landmarks. Group 3 (dashed lines)
represents objects linked to the central object but not the salient
landmarks. Group 4 (dotted lines) represents connections between
objects without involving either landmarks or the central object.
Furthermore, the entire array is divided into the left-field and the
right-field from the middle and both fields include the central
column of objects. Based on the 4 focus groups illustrated in
Figure 4, the subjects’ reaction times are presented in Figure 5, in
which mean reaction times for the left-field, the right-field, and the
average of two fields are presented separately.
We examined the group effect, the field effect (left vs. right), and
the interaction by a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA. Both of
the group effect and the field effect were statistically significant
Figure 3. Reaction time comparison between groups. A. Comparison between groups 1 (solid lines) and 2 (dotted lines). B. Comparison
between groups 3 (solid lines) and 4 (dotted lines). The error bars are standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010442.g003
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but the interaction between groups and fields was not (F(3,33) =
.719, p=.548). This result suggests three overall patterns. First,
measured by the reaction time, the psychological space has been
distorted significantly depending on the relative locations of the
object pairs, specifically, whether the object pairs contain the
landmarks or the central point. Second, object locations in the left
field were better memorized than in the right field. This probably
was due to the left-to-right reading habit and the object pairs
viewed first would be more strongly encoded. Third, the non-
Figure 5. Reaction times in Experiment 2 based on field and group variables. The error bars are standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010442.g005
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distortion induced by groups was very similar in two half fields,
indicating a hierarchical representation system with two sub-
systems splitting the entire map into the left and right halves.
To further investigate the roles of the landmarks and the central
point, we conducted 4 comparisons between 4 pairs of groups,
groups (2, 4), groups (1, 2), groups (2, 3) and groups (3, 4), over the
averaged reaction times of two half fields. First of all, the reaction
time from group 2 was significantly faster than from group 4
(mean difference =514.8 ms, t(10) =3.64, p,.005). This basically
replicates the findings from Experiment 1 that within a single
frame of reference, an object was more strongly associated with the
salient landmark than with other objects. Second, the reaction
time from group 1 was significantly slower than from group 2
(mean difference =519.3 ms, t(10) =4.39, p,.001). This
indicated that when an object can be referenced to two landmarks
instead of one, the reaction was significantly slowed down. The
reason may be that referencing an object to multiple frames of
reference causes multiple representations competing with each
other, and selecting from or switching between multiple systems
takes time. Third, the reaction time from group 2 was significantly
faster than from group 3 (mean difference =521.4 ms, t(10) =3.96,
p,.003). This suggests that the association of an object with the
landmark was significantly stronger than the association of an object
with the central object. The weaker role of the central object was
further confirmed by the fourth comparison between groups (3, 4),
which wasnotstatistically significant(meandifference =6.6 ms,t(10)
=.06, p=.95), indicating that in the presence of the salient
landmarks, the central object received little special attention
compared with other objects.
In summary, Experiment 2 confirmed our predictions of a
hierarchical and segmented organization with distinctive frames
of reference based on the salient landmarks (reference points).
Distortions arise in the psychological space in the sense that
reaction times in recalling the relative locations of object pairs
were not proportional to the distances in physical space
(Figure 6). The symmetrical distortion patterns in the left and
right half fields indicated the existence of two individual sub-
level reference systems and each was formed around its own
salient landmark. Within each sub-system, distortion occurred
surrounding the landmark respectively. The two sub-systems
competed with each other when an object could be referenced
to both of them.
Discussion
In this paper, we presented two experiments to test the
predictions of salience-based hierarchical spatial representations
by multiple intrinsic frames of reference. Our hypotheses were
derived from an integrated theory of human spatial representation
called FORMS. FORMS essentially states that a psychological
space consists of multiple representations, each with a distinctive
frame of reference and each being only a subset of all possible
spatial information. The two experiments reported here used
reaction times instead of the accuracy of the recalled relative
locations as a measure of the distortions in the psychological
representations of the physical space. The experiments used
strictly controlled object arrays to examine the roles of salient
landmarks and figurative configurations of the physical map, and
they confirmed the claims of FORMS. The results suggest that at
least two factors are responsible for inducing distinctive frames of
reference in our experiments. One is the overall figurative layout
of the entire map and the other is based on salient landmarks.
These two factors will reinforce each other if they work together.
In our experiment 1, the non-salience condition alone produced
significant distortions surrounding the central object. When
introducing the salient landmark in the salience condition, such
distortion was even greater.
Figure 6. Segmentation and distortion of psychological space described by reaction times. Reaction times in recalling spatial relations of
object pairs are not proportional to the distances in the physical space. The relative lengths of the dotted lines represent the comparison of reaction
times when the object is associated with a single landmark (group 2 in Figure 4) and when the object can be associated with two landmarks (group 1
in Figure 4), with the latter as the base length.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010442.g006
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objects that serve as the bases (origin and axis) of the intrinsic
frame of reference and the existence of multiple reference systems.
These two concepts are consistent with the category adjustment
model [14–15] and provide connections between the mechanisms
of perceptual heuristics [11,13] and categorical organization [7–9]
(also see [10]). That is, the formation of multiple reference systems
can be determined by both perceptual heuristics (bottom-up) or
categorical knowledge (top-down). Once the intrinsic frames of
reference are established, the regionalization/categorization are a
result of organization according to different reference systems. For
example, it appears that the Experiment 4 in Newcombe &
Chiang [10] did not induce distinctive salience-based categories
(sub-level reference systems). That is, the efforts to increase
conceptual processing and categorical organization by coding the
regions into different colors and different climate groups were not
effective in producing categorical organization. The reason may be
that salient anchors (landmarks) were not provided within the
regions so that distinctive frames of reference are not induced
corresponding to the individual regions. Indeed, this speculation is
confirmed by the Experiment 5 in Newcombe and Chiang [10]. It
showed that the provision of two correctly placed locations allowed
people to place other cities with excellent accuracy. This is
consistent with the findings in our Experiment 2 in that the salient
landmarks were the driving force in constructing distinctive frames
of references.
In essence, our hypotheses are founded on the construction of
multiple distinctive salience-based reference systems to account for
the distortions or biases in the psychological space. Particularly,
the salience effect attributes to the distortions not only within but
also between reference systems. Saliency can be achieved either
through top-down instructions or existing knowledge or bottom-up
perceptual distinction. Then, categorical organizations are in effect
representations in a hierarchy of multiple reference systems
around salient reference points. Within the same reference system,
distortions can occur because of the role of the salient reference
point. Furthermore, errors and interferences can arise when
people switch between different reference systems.
Methods
Experiment 1
Participants. Twenty college students and graduate students
in the Houston medical center area participated in Experiment 1
for pay. The experiments were conducted in accord with APA
standards for ethical treatment of subjects and with the approval of
IRB at University of Texas Health Center at Houston. Informed
consent was obtained from all participants in written form.
Procedure. Two conditions were compared by a repeated-
measure design, 4 blocks of trials for each condition. In each block,
subjects were first presented with an evenly spaced 363 array of
objects on a computer screen. In the salient condition, the central
object in the array was perceptually distinct from all others
(Figure 1, left panel), and in the non-salient condition, a non-
distinctive object was used instead (Figure 1, right panel). The
order of two conditions was counter-balanced between subjects.
Subjects were asked to remember the spatial layout of these objects
(self-paced). After the study phase, we tested subjects’ memory by
presenting pairs of objects on the center of the screen and asking
subjects to decide if the relative location between the pair was the
same as in the study phase. The test in each block consisted of 28
object pairs that were aligned horizontally, vertically, or diagonally
in the original layout. Each object pair was tested twice, once
positively and once negatively, in which the relative location of the
object pair in the test phase was either the same as or different
from that in the study phase. In total, each subject completed 448
trials (286268 blocks). The trials in the test phase were
randomized. The reaction time data were recorded.
Experiment 2
Participants. Eleven college students and graduate students
in the Houston medical center area who were not included in
Experiment 1 participated in Experiment 2. Participants were paid
for participation. The experiments were conducted in accord with
APA standards for ethical treatment of subjects and with the
approval of IRB at University of Texas Health Center at Houston.
Informed consent was obtained from all participants in written
form.
Procedure. Figure 4 illustrates an example layout of the
experiment setup. Compared to Experiment 1, the object array in
Experiment 2 was increased in size from 363t o3 65. All objects
were still evenly spaced. Two salient landmarks were positioned at
the coordinates (2,2) and (2,4), separate from the center location of
the entire layout at (2,3). Since we had already established the
salience effect in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 did not vary the
salience level of the landmarks. As in Experiment 1, subjects were
asked to remember the spatial layout of the objects (self-paced).
After the encoding, we tested subjects’ memory by presenting pairs
of objects on the screen and asking subjects to decide if the pair
was in its originally relative relations. Each subject was tested on 2
object arrays. In each array, 58 object pairs were tested
(horizontal, vertical and diagonal pairs only) and each pair was
tested once positively and once negatively. In total, each subject
completed 232 trials (586262 blocks). The reaction time data
were recorded.
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